Abstract-In this paper, we present non trivial upper and lower bounds on the secrec y capacit y of the degraded Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel and identif y several ranges of channel parameters where these bounds coincide with useful intuitions.
parameters where these bounds coincide with useful intuitions.
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of the presence of an eavesdropper on the capacit y . We consider the following two scenarios regarding the availabilit y of randomness: 1) a common randomness is available at the source and the two rela y s and 2) a randomness is available onl y at the source and there is no available randomness at the rela y s. We obtain the upper bound b y taking into account the correlation between the two rela y signals and the availabilit y of randomness at each encoder.
For the lower bound, we propose two t y pes of coding schemes:
1) a decode-and-forward scheme where the rela y s cooperativel y transmit the message and the fictitious message and 2) a partial DF scheme incorporated with muIticoding in which each rela y sends an independent partial message and the whole or partial fictitious message using dependent code words.
Index Terms-Wiretap channel, diamond channel, diamond wiretap channel, muIticoding I. INTRODUCTION The diamond channel introduced by Schein [1] consists of a broadcast channel (BC) from a source to two relays and a multiple access channel (MAC) from the two relays to a destination. The capacity of the diamond channel is not known in general. To simplify the problem, let us consider a diamond channel having BC with two orthogonal links and Gaussian MAC. In this setup, there is a tension between increasing the amount of information sent over the BC and increasing the coherent combining gain for the MAC. Two coding schemes corresponding to the extremes would be par tial decode-and-forward, where independent partial messages are sent to the relays, and decode-and-forward (DF), where the whole message is sent to each of the relays. By incorporating multicoding at the source, [2] , [3] proposed a coding scheme in which the relays send independent partial messages using dependent codewords and showed that this coding scheme strictly outperforms the DF and partial DF in some regime. Furthermore, [3] showed an upper bound by taking into account the correlation between the two relay signals, which is strictly tighter than the cutset bound. This upper bound was shown to coincide with the lower bound of [2] , [3] for some channel parameters.
In this paper, we consider the degraded Gaussian diamond wiretap channel presented in Fig. 1 and present lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity by exploiting the cor relation between the two relay signals. We identify several ranges of channel parameters where these bounds coincide with useful intuitions and investigate the effect of the presence of an eavesdropper on the capacity. We note that this model is a natural first step to studying diamond-wiretap channel be cause the sum secrecy capacity of the multiple access-wiretap channel has been characterized only for the degraded Gaussian case [4] . A practical situation corresponding to this model is the side channel attack [5] where the eavesdropper attacks by probing the physical signals such as timing information and power consumption leaked from the legitimate destination. In the presence of an eavesdropper, the technique of utilizing randomness is widely used to confuse the eavesdropper. We consider the following two scenarios regarding the availability of randomness: 1) a common randomness of rate R' is available at the source and the two relays and 2) a randomness of rate R' is available only at the source and there is no available randomness at the relays. See [6] , [7] for the related works assuming restricted randomness at encoders.
For the upper bound, we generalize the upper bound on the capacity of the diamond channel [3] and the upper bound on the sum secrecy capacity of the multiple access-wiretap channel [4] . For the lower bound, we propose two types of coding schemes: 1) a decode-and-forward (DF) scheme where the relays cooperatively transmit the message and the fictitious message and 2) a partial DF scheme incorporated with multicoding in which each relay sends an independent partial message and the whole or partial fictitious message using dependent codewords. If there is no secrecy constraint, our partial DF scheme incorporated with multicoding falls back to that in [2] , [3] . Interestingly, in the presence of the eavesdropper, the availability of randomness at the encoders is shown to affect the optimal selection of correlation coefficient between the two relay signals in our proposed schemes.
MODEL
Consider the degraded Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel in Fig. 1 where g E [0, 1), Xl and X2 are the channel inputs from relay 1 and relay 2, respectively, Ny is the Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance at the legitimate destination, and Nz is the Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance of 1 -g at the eavesdropper. Ny and Nz are assumed to be independent. The transmit power constraint at relay k = 1 ,2 is given as � L:� l Xf,i ::; Pk, where n denotes the number of channel uses. Note that the channel output at the eavesdropper is a physically degraded version of the channel output at the legitimate destination.
We consider the following two scenarios regarding the avail ability of randomness. In the first scenario, a common fictitious
' P is available at the source and the two relays. In this case, a (2nR, n ) secrecy code consists of a message W rv Unif[1 : 2nR], an encoding function at the source that maps (W,
, and a decoding function at the legitimate destination that maps yn E yn to W E [1 : 2nR]. In the second scenario, a fictitious message M of rate R' is available only at the source and the encoding at the two relays is restricted to be deterministic. In this case, the encoding function at relay k = 1 ,2 maps Jk E [1 : 2n C k ] to Xl: E XI:.
For both scenarios, the probability of error is given as p � n ) = P( W i-W). A secrecy rate of R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes such that lim n -+ oo p � n ) = 0 and lim n -+ oo �I(W; zn) = O. The secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates. Let C � l ) and C � 2 ) denote the secrecy capacity for the first scenario and for the second scenario, respectively. Remark 1: Because the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper do not cooperate, the secrecy capacity in Fig.  1 is the same as that of stochastically degraded case, in which Z is given as Z = y'gXl + y'gX2 + N�, where N� has zero mean and unit variance and is independent of Ny.
Ill. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present main results of this paper on the secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel described in Section 11. For the brevity of presentation, let us define the following functions:
for two integers i and j denotes the set {i,i + 1, ... ,j}.
where the domain of h, 12, 13, ! 6, and h is [-1, 1] and that
The following two theorems give upper and lower bounds on c 1 l ) , respectively, whose proofs are in [8] .
Theorem 1: For R' 2: 0, C � l ) is upper-bounded by min(m ax(5l, 52), max(53, 5 4 )) , 
We note that the functions ik's for k E [1 : 5] are defined in (1 ).
In Theorem 1, we note that the upper bound max(5l, 52) is the same as that in [3] that assumes no secrecy constraint. This is natural because the secrecy capacity is upper-bounded by the capacity without secrecy constraint, which is not affected by the common randomness at the encoders. To derive the upper bound max(53 , 5 4 ), we generalize the bounding techniques [3] and [4] taking into account the secrecy constraint and the available randomness at the encoders.
In Theorem 2, R �� (p ) is achieved by using a DF scheme where the source sends the message to both relays and the relays cooperatively transmit the message and the common fictitious message over the wiretap channel. On the other hand, R � 1 6 F_M ( P ) is achieved by a partial DF incorporated with multicoding (PDF-M) where each relay sends an independent partial message and the common fictitious message using dependent codewords. The source performs multicoding as follows: the message w is represented as two partial messages ( Wl ' W2), a codebook for relay k = 1 , 2 consisting of inde pendently generated x k sequences is constructed for each Wk and m, and the source finds a jointly typical sequence pair ( x 1( wI, m, I I), x '2( w2, m, 1 2 )) and sends ( wk, l k) to relay k for k = 1 ,2. A more detailed explanation for the PDF-M scheme is given in [8] . Let R � 1 6 F = R � 1 6 F_M (0 ) denote the partial DF (PDF) rate without multicoding at the source.
To compare our lower and upper bounds, let us consider sufficiently large R' and symmetric channel parameters, To compare our lower and upper bounds, let us consider suf ficiently large R' and symmetric channel parameters, i.e., PI = P2 = P and Cl = C2 = C for some non negative P and C. It can be easily proved that 1) the PDF scheme, which achieves 3 min(h(O) , f 4( 0) -15(0)), is optimal for C ::; � ( 1 4 (0 ) -f5 (0 )), i.e., the BC cut is the bottleneck, and 2) the DF scheme, which achieves min(C, f4( 1 ) -15 ( 1 )), is optimal for C :::: f 4( 1 ) -15 ( 1 ), i.e., the MAC cut is the bottleneck. When neither the BC cut nor the MAC cut is the bottleneck, the PDF-M scheme strictly outperforms the PDF and DF schemes for some range of C as shown in Fig. 2 . For example, when P = 1 and g = 0.1, the PDF-M scheme strictly outperforms the PDF and DF schemes for 0.33 < C < 0.89.
Furthermore, Fig. 2 shows that the PDF bound gets close to the upper bound in Theorem 1 as P increases. The following theorem states that the PDF scheme is indeed asymtotically optimal as PI or P2 tends to infinity, whose proof is in [8] .
Theorem 3: For the first scenario with R' :::: 15 (0 ) and PI -+ 00 or P2 -+ 00,4 the PDF scheme is asymptotically optimal.
Next, the following two theorems give upper and lower bounds on C � 2 ) , respectively, whose proofs are in [8] . 
We note that the functions f k'S for k E [ 1 : 5] are defined in ( (2) ( ) (2) ( ) (2) ( )) max R DF p , R pDF-DF-M P , R pDF-PDF-M P , where
We note that the functions f k'S for k E [ 1 : 7] are defined in
(1 ). Note that in both the upper and lower bounds for the first scenario, the term f5(P), which corresponds to the required rate of randomness to confuse the eavesdropper, appears only with !4(p), which signifies the amount of information sent through the MAC. In contrast, in both the upper and lower bounds for the second scenario, because the fictitious message has to be sent through the BC, 15 (p) appears in common for all terms. This affects sufficient ranges of correlation coefficient for the lower bounds for large enough R' as remarked in the following.
Remark 2: For large enough R', sufficient ranges of cor relation coefficient p for the lower bounds in Theorem 2 and Theorem 5 are different. For the first scenario, note that the DF rate is maximized at p = 1 and that it is enough to consider non negative p for the PDF-M scheme. On the other hand, for the second scenario, because the minus term -!5( p ) is common for all terms, considering smaller p can be beneficial by decreasing f5 (p) and we need consider all -1 ::; P ::; 1 .
In the DF scheme for the second scenario, the source sends and P2 = 1, RpDF-DF-M(P) is strictly higher than R� 2
6F_P DF _M(P)
for some range of C.
to both relays the fictitious messa R e as well as the message.
Hence, Rg� is obtained from RgF by replacing Cl and C 2 by Cl -f5(P) and C 2 -f5(P), respectively. For a partial DF scheme incorporated with multicoding for the second scenario, a straightforward extension from that for the first scenario is to let the source send the fictitious message m as well as the partial message Wk and the relay codeword index lk to relay k for k = 1 ,2 . Since each relay decodes a partial genuine message and a whole fictitious message, we call this scheme as PDF-DF-M scheme. Note that Rp ( 2 ) (p ) I ' S DF-DF-M obtained by replacing Cl and C 2 by Cl-f5(P) and C 2 -f5(P), . R( l ) respectlve y, m P DF-M' However, since the same fictitious message is sent to both relays, there exists inefficiency in the use of the BC. To resolve this inefficiency, we let each of relay codebooks be indexed by independent partial fictitious message, i.e., codebook for relay k = 1 ,2 is constructed for each ( Wk , mk ) by representing m as two partial ficti tious messages ( ml' m 2) ' By using this PDF-PDF-M scheme where each relay decodes a partial genuine message and a partial fictitious message, we show that R( 2 ) (p ) .
. P DF-P DF-M IS achIevable, which has h (p ) intead of h (p ) -15 (p ) in R�2i)F_ DF_ M (P) . We note that having independent fictitious message at each relay reduces the achievable rate region over the MAC, which results in additional contraints Cl > f 6 (P) and C 2 > h(p) in R� 2 6F_ P DF_ M (P) . Nevertheless, as long as Cl = C 2 , R� 2 6F_ P DF_ M (P) is always higher than or equal to R� 2 6F_ DF_ M (P) because h( p) > 215 ( p) , which should be satisfied if R�6F-DF-M (P) > 0, implies Cl > f 6 (P) and C 2 > h(p). If Cl =1= C 2 , R� 2 6F_ DF_ M (P) can be strictly higher than R�6F-P DF-M (p ) as illustrated in Fig.  3 . Let R� 2 6F_ DF = R�6F-DF-M ( 0 ) and R( 2 ) = ( 2 ) P DF-P DF Rp DF-P DF-M (O) denote the rates of PDF-DF and PDF-PDF schemes (without multicoding).
Similarly as for the first scenario, let us consider sufficiently large R ' and symmetric channel parameters. Since Cl = C 2 ,
we only consider the DF, PDF-PDF-M, and PDF-PDF schemes for the lower bounds. It can be easily proved that the DF scheme, which achieves maxpE[ -l,l] min(C , f4(P)) -15 ( p) , is optimal for C :::: 14 ( 1 ), i.e., the MAC cut is the bottleneck. 
,,,,,,,Rgt We can see in Fig. 4 that the PDF-PDF rate coincides with the PDF-PDF-M rate at one point. This is because a negative correlation between the two relay signals is helpful for small C due to the reason in Remark 2, i.e., the BC cut is the bottleneck, and positive correlation becomes beneficial as C increases, i.e., the MAC cut becomes bottleneck. Fig. 4 also shows that the PDF-PDF-M rate is zero up to some threshold value of C due to the constraint C > f 6 (P) in R� 2 6F_ P DF_ M (P) and the threshold value decreases as P decreases. Indeed, we can prove that the threshold value tends to zero as P tends to zero. Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows that the PDF-PDF-M rate coincides with the upper bound in Theorem 4 for some range of C, e.g., 1 . 1 < C < 2. 18 when P = 1 0 and 9 = 0. 1 . The following theorem gives a condition where the PDF-PDF-M rate coincides with the upper bound in Theorems 4, whose proof is in [8] . h(p') = J4(P') ·5
Theorem 6 indicates that the upper and lower bounds in Theorems 4 and 5 coincide for 1.1 < C < 2.18 when P = 10 and 9 = 0.1 and for 1.91 < C < 3.82 when P = 100 and 9 = 0.1. Now, a natural question is how the presence of an eaves dropper affects the capacity. We partially answer this question by comparing our results with the lower and upper bounds in [3] that are derived without secrecy constraint. Note that when there is no secrecy constraint, the availability of randomness at the encoders does not affect the capacity. Hence, the capacity without secrecy constraint is higher than or equal to the secrecy capacity with secrecy constraint both for the first and the second scenarios. We compare the bounds in Fig. 5 for sufficiently large R' and symmetric channel parameters. First, as illustrated in Fig. 5-(a) , the upper bound without secrecy constraint and the lower bound for the first scenario coincide up to C :::; � (f4( 0 ) -J5( 0 )) . This indicates that, when there is a sufficient amount of common randomness between the source and the relays, there is no decrease in capacity due to an eavesdropper for some range of C. On the other hand, for the same channel parameters, Fig. 5-(b) shows that the lower bound without secrecy constraint is strictly higher than the upper bound for the second scenario for all range of C > O .
This indicates that, when there is no randomness at the relays, the secrecy capacity for the second scenario can be strictly smaller than the capacity without secrecy constraint for all range of C.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we derived non trivial upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian diamond wire tap channel under two scenarios regarding the availability of randomness. Our upper bound was obtained by taking into account the correlation between the two relay signals and the availability of randomness at each encoder, which generalizes both the upper bound on the capacity of the diamond channel without secrecy constraint [3] and the upper bound on the sum secrecy capacity of the MAC wiretap channel [4] . For the lower bound, we proposed DF scheme and partial DF scheme incorporated with multicoding that is called PDF-M scheme for the first scenario and PDF-DF-M and PDF-PDF M schemes for the second scenario depending on whether the relay decodes the whole or partial fictitious message. In the first scenario, PDF-M scheme with strictly positive correlation coefficient was shown to outperform DF and PDF (without multicoding) schemes for some channel parameters. We also showed that the PDF scheme is asymptotically optimal for the first scenario when at least one of relay power constraint tends to infinity. For the second scenario, we presented a condition for channel parameters where the PDF-PDF-M scheme is optimal. Furthermore, because the fictitious message has to be sent through the BC for the second scenario, it was shown 5 We note that under the condition (2) , pi E [O,p' ] such that h(p') = f4 (pi) exists. Comparison with the lower and upper bounds without secrecy constraint when P = 10 and 9 = 0.1.
to be befinicial to consider negative correlation in all DF, PDF-DF-M, PDF-PDF-M schemes when the BC cut becomes the bottleneck. Furthermore, we investigated the effect of the presence of an eavesdropper on the capacity. If there is a sufficient amount of common randomness between the source and the relays, it was shown that there is no decrease in capacity due to an eavesdropper for some range of C.
